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the prospect of the parties concerned embarking upon another long
trial involving possibly many more years, seems quite unlikely. Some
kind of settlement is a more probable result. 19 Finally, s. 106 of The
Highway Traffic Act,20 provides that, except in the case of a collision
between motor vehicles, whenever damage is sustained by any person
by reason of a motor vehicle on a highway, the onus is on the owner
or driver thereof to disprove negligence. Brown argued that applying
this section to the facts, Postma, swerved to avoid and pass a vehicle
driven by Brown because there was no collision between his and
Little's vehicle, the onus was upon the latter to disprove negligence
on his part, and not upon Brown to prove it. If this reasoning were
adopted it would mean that the owner or driver of the passed car
could become involved, by a mere allegation of negligence, in an
action in which he would be required to assume the burden of disproving his own negligence. It is submitted that the Legislature did
not mean to have such a construction put on s. 106.21 Consequently,
the case could have been disposed of as by the Court of Appeal on
the ground that the appellants failed to discharge the burden of
proving that the tail-light on the truck was either inoperative or
defective, and that that constituted negligence which contributed to
the accident.
The Supreme Court of Canada was correct in unanimously
holding that a breach, by the driver of a motor vehicle, of a statutory
provision designed for the protection of other users of the highway
(such as failing to have a lighted tail light when travelling at night),
and which breach is an effective cause of an accident, imposes at
least a prima facie liability on such driver.
One question left to be answered by some future decision is
whether this liability may be discharged by showing that the breach
occurred without negligence on the part of the driver.

J. RONALD SMITH"

TAXATION

Guay v. Lafleur, [1965] S.C.R. 12.
INCOME TAX - INVESTIGATION - INQUIRY BY PERSON AUTHORIZED BY
MINISTER INTO THE AFFAIRS OF TAXPAYER WHETHER TAXPAYER
ENTITLED TO BE PRESENT AND REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL AT HEARINGS.

There is no equity in a taxing statute.

(Anon.)

19 That is exactly what happened in this case.
20 Supra, footnote 18.

21 Supra, footnote 18.

* J. Ronald Smith, LL.B. (Osgoode), is a member of the 1966 graduating
class.
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In an action heard before the full court,1 it was decided, Hall J.
dissenting, that a person whose activities were the subject of an
inquiry under s. 126(4) of the Income Tax Act 2 had no right to
cross examine witnesses at the inquiry, give evidence on his own
behalf, be represented by counsel or even to be present at the hearings.
The facts of the case were not disputed. Guay, an officer of the
Department of National Revenue, was authorized by. the Deputy
Minister, under the provisions of the Act, to investigate the affairs3
of Lafleur and thirteen other individuals, corporations and estates.
Hearings were scheduled and witnesses called for various dates. Although Lafleur was not officially advised of the inquiry, he discovered
that it was to take place and, at the opening sitting, attorneys presented themselves on his behalf asking that he be allowed to be
present and to be represented by counsel during the examination of
all persons summoned. Guay refused. Lafleur obtained an injunction
from Mr. Justice Brossard, suspending the hearings, 4 and the latter's
judgment was affirmed by the Court of Queen's Bench.5
The issue raised by this case is whether there is a common law
right-or a principle of natural justice-which entitles a person who
is the subject of an inquiry to be represented by counsel at the hearings. The Supreme Court of Canada decided that there was not. The
basis of this decision is the distinction drawn between hearings which
involve a disposition of the rights of the parties, and hearings in the
nature of an inquiry where the conducting officer does not have the
power immediately to dispose of any rights. It is a deeply rooted
principle of the common law, embodied in the maxim audi alteram
"must
partem, that a tribunal, in performing quasi-judicial functions,
act in good faith and fairly listen to both sides"; 6 however, "the
maxim audi alteram partem does not apply to an administrative
officer, whose function is simply to collect information and make a
I Taschereau C.J. and Cartwright, Fauteux, Abbott, Martland, Judson,
Ritchie, Hall and Spence JJ.
2 R.S.C. 1952, c. 148, s. 126(4). "The Minister may, for any purpose related
to the administration or enforcement of this Act, authorize any person, whether or not he is an officer of the Department of National Revenue, to make
such inquiry as he may deem necessary with reference to anything relating
to the administration or enforcement of this Act."
126(8). "For the purpose of an inquiry authorized under subsection (4),
the person authorized to make the inquiry has all the powers and authorities
conferred on a commissioner by sections 4 and 5 of the Inquiries Act or which
may be conferred on a commissioner under section 11 thereof."
3 Rend Lafleur, Marie-Marthe Lafleur, Frangois Fournelle, Dame Henriette
Lafleur-Fournelle, Jean Fauvier, Jean Chapolard, Raoul Dasserre, P. Sutter,
Henri Clouard, Luc Lemaire-Lafleur Lt6e, Les Placements Montcalm Limitde,
Edifice Lafleur Ltde, Succession Leonard Lafleur, and the Estate of Hermas
Fournelle.
4 (1962), 31 D.L.R. (2d) 575.
5 [19631 Que. Q.B. 623, [19631 C.T.C. 201, 63 D.T.C. 1098, (1964), 42 D.L.R.
(2d) 148.
6 Board of Education v. Rice, [19111 A.C. 179, at p. 182; Wood v. Woad
(1874), L.R. 9 Ex. 190; Lapointe v. L'Association de Bienfaisance et de Retraite
de la Police de Montreal, [19061 A.C. 535; L'AZliance des Professeurs Catholiques de Montreal v. Labour Relations Board, [19531 2 S.C.R. 140; Errington
v. Minister of Health, [19351 1 K.B. 249 (C.A.).
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report, and, who has no power either to impose a liability or to give
'7
a decision affecting the rights of parties.
The rights asserted by Lafleur were not expressly recognized by
either the Income Tax Act 8 or the Inquiries Act 9 and this was acknowledged by the trial judge. He based his judgment on the ground that,
in refusing to permit Lafleur to be present and represented by counsel,
Guay had contravened s. 2 (e) of the Canadian Bill of Rights.1 0
2. Every law of Canada shall, unless it is expressly declared by an Act
of the Parliament of Canada that it shall operate notwithstanding the
Canadian Bill of Rights, be so construed and applied as not to abrogate,
abridge or infringe or to authorize the abrogation, abridgment or infringement of any of the rights or freedoms herein recognized and declared,
and in particular, no law of Canada shall be construed or applied so as
to...
(e) deprive a person of the right to a fair hearing in accordance with
the principles of fundamental justice for the determination of his rights
and obligations.
In the Supreme Court of Canada, the Canadian Bill of Rights 1 was
summarily dismissed as inapplicable since no rights and obligations
were determined by the person appointed to conduct the investiga2
tion.'
Mr. Justice Abbott agreed with the reasons given in the dissenting judgments of Hyde and Montgomery JJ. in the Court below' 3 and
added merely the observation that the power given to the Minister
under s. 126 (4)14 is only one of a number of similar powers of inquiry
which are granted in the Act to enable the Minister to obtain the
facts he considers necessary to discharge the duty of assessing and
collecting taxes payable. The taxpayer's right is not affected until
an assessment is made and then the appeal provisions of the Act are
open to him. Abbott J. did not think that the power conferred on
Guay to compel witnesses to attend and testify under oath' 5 changed
the nature of the inquiry.
Cartwright J. agreed but also added some observations. First,
The function of the appellant under the terms of his appointment is
simply to gather information; his duties are administrative, they are
neither judicial nor quasi-judicial.16
Then he concluded:
Generally speaking, apart from some statutory provision making it applicable, the maxim audi alteram partem does not apply to an administrative
officer whose function is simply to collect information and make a report
7 Guay v. Lafleur, [1965] S.C.R. 12, at p. 18, per Cartwright J.
8 Supra,footnote 2.
9 R.S.C. 1952, c. 154, ss. 4, 5, 11.
10 S.C. 1960, c. 44.
11 bid.
12 Supra, footnote 7, at p. 16, per Abbott J., at p. 19, per Cartwright J.,
and was not even referred to by Spence J.
13 Supra, footnote 5.
14 Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 148.
15 Ibid., c. 126(8).
16 Supra, footnote 7, at p. 17.
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and who has no power either7 to impose a liability or give a decision
affecting the rights of parties.'

Spence J. approached the issue from an examination of St. John
v. Frazer 8 which stood for the proposition that persons who might
be affected by an investigation under the British Columbia Securities
Fraud Prevention Act 19 did not have the right to cross examine all
witnesses giving evidence in the inquiry. He adopted the words of
21
20
Lord Shaw in the Arlidge case, and applied in St. Jolvn v. Frazer,
that "it is natural that lawyers should favour lawyer-like methods
but it is not for the judiciary to impose its own method on administrative or executive officers". His Lordship did, however, think that
the investigator was bound "to act judicially in the sense of being
fair and impartial" 22 but this did not require him to permit Lafleur
and his counsel to be present at every examination whether or not
he were to attempt to cross-examine witnesses.
In view of the brevity of the majority judgments in the Supreme
Court of Canada, which did not delve into the meaning to be attributed
to the phrase "acting judicially in the sense of being fair and impartial", it would be in order to examine the dissenting judgments of
Hyde and Montgomery JJ. in the Court of Queen's Bench, which

were affirmed on appeal. Hyde J. accepted the statement of Davis J.
in St. Jolvn v. Frazer23 that any person or body acting in a judicial
capacity must act fairly and impartially, but, he suggested, that it
would be going too far to apply that requirement fully to a person
exercising an administrative function. In reply to Lafleur's argument
that it was unfair that witnesses should be obliged to testify under
oath in his absence, because, even though that testimony was inadmissible in subsequent proceedings, it could be used to test credibility and as a threat of a perjury charge, Hyde J. answered:
Regardless as to whether it is "fair" or not, with respect, "fairness" is
not the test. As a purely administrative matter where the person holding
the inquiry neither decides nor adjudicates upon anything, it is not for
except to the
the courts to specify how that inquiry is to be conducted
extent if any, that the subject's rights are denied him.24

Mr. Justice Montgomery also concedes that there are circumstances
when the Court might intervene in the exercise of an administrative
function.
What the authorities do establish is that the mere fact that a board or
commission is carrying out an administrative function does not automatically exempt it from judicial control. It may well be that the courts
should intervene if there were any evidence of bias or partiality on the
part of the appellant, but it appears that he is merely attempting to do
his duty and to 25carry out the inquiry in accordance with the policies of
his Department.
17

Ibid., at p. 18.

[1935] S.C.R. 441, 3 D.L.R. 465, 64 C.C.C. 90.
19 S.B.C. 1930, c. 64, ss. 10, 29.
20 [19151 A.C. 120, at p. 138.
18

21
22
23
24
25

Supra, footnote 18.
Supra, footnote 7, at p. 23.
Supra, footnote 18.

Supra, footnote 5, at p. 209 (C.T.C.).
Ibid., at pp. 228-229.
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These statements by their Lordships do not resolve the problem
but merely bring to a head the fundamental issues in this case: what
are the subject's rights in these circumstances? Is an inspector representing the Tax Department, which, depending on the results of the
inquiry, may be the prosecutor in a subsequent action, an impartial
and unbiased investigator? 26 Is the taxpayer's position affected, in
substance, by the inquiry? The answers to these questions merit a
thorough examination of the considerations which call for the power
in an investigating officer to exclude from the hearings the party
whose activities are the very subject of the inquiry, and the weighing
of these against the interest of the individual in knowing the case
which is being constructed against him, and having an opportunity
to reply. In order to give a satisfactory answer to these thorny questions it is essential that the court examine the substance of what is
taking place and not merely the form. Such an examination is lacking
in the cursory judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada, which
contented itself with the repetition of old legal clich6s. A hesitant
attempt at considering some of these factors was made by Hyde and
Montgomery JJ. in the Court of Queen's Bench, but was inadequate
to the problem at hand.
Hyde J. recognized that the making of sworn statements is a
common every day occurrence and the deponent is frequently
examined in subsequent court proceedings where the interest of another may be affected by those statements. His Lordship knew of no
requirement in law that any person likely to be affected in such a way
was entitled to be present with counsel when such a sworn statement
was originally made and he could see little distinction between that
case and the present. An example which comes to mind is an information sworn out against a party, which may lead to his being charged
with an offence and perhaps arrested. It would be absurd to suggest
that the information was of no effect unless the accused were present
when it was sworn. Such a course of action would be wholly impracticable. It appeared to His Lordship that if the taxpayer had the right
to be present and represented at the inquiry he would have the same
right under s. 126(1) (c) 27 with the result that the departmental
26 On n'est dvidemment pas en presence d'une commission impartiale. Si
probe et si sympathique soit-il, l'appellant joue le r6le d'accusateur, d'avocat
et de juge, plus que cela celui d'un veritable inquisiteur. 11 veut pour des
fins ultdrieurs dtayer sa preuve. Or, qui dit inquisition dit "perquisitlon
rigoureuse m6l(e d'arbitraire". Fonctionaire d6vou au d6partement dont 11
fait partie, il est forc~ment, m~me malgr6 lu prdjug6." Supra, footnote 5,
at pp. 204-205, per Bissonette J.
27 Supra, footnote 14. 126(1) "Any person thereunto authorized by the
Minister for any purpose related to the administration or enforcement of this
Act may, at all reasonable times, enter into any premises or place where any
business is carried on or any property is kept or anything is done in connection with any business or any books or records are, or should be, kept pursuant to this Act, and
(c) require the owner or manager of the property or business and any
other person on the premises or place to give him all reasonable assistance
[Footnote continued on page 341.1
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investigation would be turned into a public inquiry out of all proportion to practical requirements. The argument based on practicability
is a cogent one indeed. In enacting the provisions, Parliament must
have intended that the Income Tax Act 28 should work. The weakness

of this argument lies in fitting it to the facts. Is the analogy between
a formal inquiry under s. 126 (4)29 and a common statutory deposition
complete, or is this hearing more analogous to a preliminary inquiry
rather than the swearing of an information? It is submitted that there
is a distinction between a formal inquiry and an informal and spontaneous investigation such as provided for by s. 126 (1) (c).30 In the
latter case it would be impracticable to give notice to the taxpayer
to attend with counsel while a spot audit of the company books is
carried out.
To Hyde J.
[wlhat is important is that the taxpayer is entitled to his day in court
where he is assured of a fair and impartial hearing with all evidence for
the purpose of3 determining his case being submitted under the ordinary
rules of proof. 1

Mr. Justice Montgomery adopted the same approach when he stated:
While the Income Tax Act confers upon the Minister wide powers of
investigation and assessment, there is nothing final in any such assessment. On the contrary, express provision is made whereby the taxpayer
may protest the assessment and appeal to the Tax Appeal Board and to
the Exchequer Court ....

There is, therefore, no question of the tax-

payer being denied
the opportunity of explaining his position or making
a full defence.32
Brave words! but what course of action can Lafleur expect will follow

upon the report? The report will be submitted to the Department
where a decision will be made on the basis of the recommendations of
the Commissioner. In a busy Department the effect of the recommendations of the Commissioner, who conducted the inquiry, on
forming the decision are decisive. If the evidence collected by the
Commissioner, which Lafleur had no opportunity to explain, indicates
that taxes have not been paid, a re-assessment by the Minister automatically issues. The onus then rests upon Lafleur to establish the
essential facts upon the basis of which the assessment should be varied
or upset.3 3 If the taxpayer is successful, upon the Minister appealing
to the Exchequer Court of Canada, he is afforded a second opportunity
with his audit or examination and to answer all proper questions relating to
the audit or examination either orally or, if he so requires, in writing, on
oath or by statutory declaration and, for that purpose, require the owner or
manager to attend at the premises or place with him,
28 Supra,footnote 14.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Siu
footnote 5, at pp. 209-210 (C.T.C.).
t,
32 !bid., at p. 228.
33 Income Tax Act, supra, footnote 14, s.46(7) "An assessment shall,
subject to being varied or vacated on an objection or appeal under this Part
and subject to a re-assessment, be deemed to be valid and binding notwithstanding any error, defect or omission therein or in any proceeding under
this Act relating thereto." See also Dezura v. M.N.R., [19481 Ex. C.R. 10,
[19481 1 D.L.R. 465, 3 D.T.C. 1101; McGladdery v. M.N.R., 13 Tax A.B.C. 330,
55 D.T.C. 471.
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to vindicate himself at a trial de novo. 34 Thus, without any "adjudication" or an opportunity at the inquiry to explain his actions or even
to know the nature of the case against him, Lafleur may find himself
in the same position as any person whose rights have been adjudicated
upon in any court.
In the Court of Queen's Bench Mr. Justice Rinfret recognized
the substantive character of the proceedings taken under the Income
Tax Act.35 In answer to the argument that the inquiry did not define
the rights and obligations of Lafleur but rather that this was the
function of the Minister to whom the report was submitted, he replied
that these proceedings constitute a whole, even if they are carried
out in two phases. The inquiry and the decision of the Minister on the
report are intimately linked and result in the definition or determination by the Minister of the rights and obligations of the person who
was the subject of the inquiry.3 6 Support for this position can be
derived from analogy to those cases where the function of deciding
is separated from that of collecting the evidence upon which the decision is to be made.37 Thus, where a Minister was authorized to
approve an order for the demolition of substandard housing, subject
to causing a local public inquiry to be held, and consideration of the
report, his confirmation was quashed when subsequent to the hearing
a municipality applying for the order submitted evidence which
parties, who objected, were not given an opportunity to answer.3 8 No
attempt was made by the Court to delineate between the inquiry
and the ministerial decision. Failure to grant one of the parties the
opportunity of answering all the relevant evidence vitiated the Minister's decision. 39 It is important to note, however, that in distinction to
Guay v. Lafieur,40 the Minister was obliged to hold an inquiry and his
decision did "affect" the rights of the parties. But ought this to make
a difference?
Rinfret J. was of the opinion that the inquiry was of a quasijudicial character.4 ' This same problem of what is administrative and
34 M.N.R. V. Simpsons Ltd., [1953] Ex. C.R. 93, where Thorson P. held
that since an appeal to the Exchequer Court is a trial de novo in which the
validity of an assessment is called into question, the assessment must be
presumed to be valid until the taxpayer establishes the contrary. A judgment
of the Tax Appeal Board becomes worthless when the Minister appeals to
the Exchequer Court. The original assessment is automatically revived in all
its former vigour.
35 Supra, footnote 14.
36 Supra,footnote 5, at p. 212 (C.T.C.).
37 M.N.R. v. Wrights' Canadian Ropes Limited, [1947] A.C. 109 (P.C.);
Alward v. McIntosh, [19381 1 W.W.R. 690 (Alta. S.C.). The Ontario Municipal
Board makes frequent use of s. 15 of The Ontario Municipal Board Act which
permits the chairman to authorize one member of the Board to conduct the
hearing of an application and to report to the Board.

38 Erringtonv. Minister of Health, supra,footnote 6.

39 See also Knapman v. Board of Health, supra, footnote 6,
40 Supra, footnote 7.
41 Supra, footnote 5, at p. 215 (C.T.C.). "Je suis donc d'opinion que l'enqudte jugde necessaire pour le Ministre de Revenue National n'est pas exclu.
sivement et purement affaire administrative et qu'en raison des pouvoirs
extraordinaires accordds au d~partment elle revft A plus d'un point de vue
un caract~re judiciare suffisant pour confdrer a l'intim le droit de s'y faire
reprdsenter.
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what is quasi-judicial was considered in Errington v. Minister of

Healt 42 where it was strenuously urged that the Minister in confirming the order acted in an administrative capacity. Greer L.J. said:
. [I]n so far as the Minister deals with the matter of the confirmation
of a closing order in the absence of objection by the owners . . . he ...
[acts] in a ministerial or administrative capacity, and ... [is] entitled
• . . to make up his mind whether the order would be in the public

interest. But ... where objections are taken by those ... [parties] ...
affected by the order, . . . in deciding whether . .. [the closing] order
. . the Minister should be
should be made in spite of the objections . 43

regarded as exercising quasi-judicial functions.

The remarks of Maugham L.J. on this distinction are no less
perplexing.
•

.

. [A]lthough the act of affirming a clearance area order is an adminis-

trative act, the consideration which must precede the doing of that act
is of the nature of a quasi-judicial consideration, and the Minister is
bound to the extent mentioned by the House of Lords in the Board of
Education v. Rice.44

How satisfactory is a criterion which chamelion-like transmutes the
character of a given act performed by one party with the change in
attitude to that act by another party? The attempt to distinguish
between what is judicial and what administrative encounters formidable difficulty in that their most significant feature is shared in common; both functions involve making a decision between alternative
course of action. In a judicial action there are generally at least
two parties whose interests are affected, whereas in administration
no one's interests need necessarily be overtly affected. Both adjudication and administration share the same core but the periphery of the
latter is broader. In drawing the distinction the courts associate the
former with a lis inter partes and the latter with the application of
policy. However, the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in
Guay v. Lafeur45 involves the application of policy no less than the
determination of an administrator; the superficial distinction is that,
in the former case, the focus is fixed on the parties to the action,
while in the latter event the focus shifts to a much broader spectrum.
Small wonder then that even the Judicial Committee of the Privy
46
Council found it easier to describe rather than define the distinction!
42

Supra,footnote 6.

43 Ibid., at p. 259.
44 Ibid., at p. 27$.

Supra, footnote 7.
Labour Relations Board of Saskatchewan v,. John East Iron Works
Ltd., [1949] A.C. 134, [1948] 4 D.L.R. 673, [1948] 2 W.W.R. 1055. See also S. A.
De Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (1959), pp. 37-47; Report
of the Committee on Minister's Powers, Cmd. 4060 (U.K.) (1932), pp. 71-82,
esp. 81-82, 93. For a criticism of the distinction drawn in the Report of the
Committee on Minister's Powers, see Report of the Franks Committee,
Cmnd. 218 (1957), p. 6; W. I. Jennings, The Report on Minister's Powers
(1932), 10 Public Administration 333; W. I. Jennings, The Law and the Constitution (4th ed.), Appx. I; W. A. Robson, Justice and Administrative Law
(3d ed.), pp. 444 et seq.; for a favourable comment, see D. M. Gordon, Administrative Tribunals and the Courts (1933), 49 L.Q.R. 94, 419; H. W. R.
Wade, 'Quasi-Judicial' and its Background (1949), 10 Camb. L.J. 216.
4S
46
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It is inevitable, therefore, that the attempt to draw a line between
quasi-judicial and administrative functions as the border beyond
which the Court will not venture is doomed to create confusion and
obscurity in the law. 47
For certain purposes 48 a body exercising powers of an advisory,
deliberative or investigatory character only, or which have no effect
until confirmed by another body, has in the past been held not to be
acting in a judicial capacity. 49 The fact that such a body is not acting
47 The difficulty is further compounded by the fact that "the meaning
of judicial varies according to the purpose for which the meaning has to be
defined. A function that is judicial in so far as it is reviewable by certiorari
may become 'administrative' when an attempt is made to establish that It
attracts absolute privilege in the law of defamation. (This emerges most
clearly in the case of licensing tribunals: see esp. Royal Aquarium & summer
and Winter Gardens Society v. Parkinson, [18921 1 Q.B. 431; Attwood v.
Chapman, [19141 3 K.B. 275.) And not only do definitions of 'judicial' vary
between different legal contexts, but they not infrequently vary within one
individual legal context." See De Smith, op. cit., pp. 35, 36.
Thus, it is not the same thing to say that a tribunal is performing a
judicial function, and that it has a duty to act judicially. This point will be
considered infra.
48 E.g. immunity to prohibtion or certiorari, absolute privilege for what
is said during the proceedings.
49 Re Grosvenor & West End Terminus Hotel Co. (1897), 13 T.L.R. 309,
76 L.T. 337; Hearts of Oak Assurance Co. 'v. A.G., [19321 A.C. 392; O'Connor
v. Waldron, [1935] A.C. 76; Royal Aquarium , Summer and Winter Gardens
Society v. Parkinson, [18921 1 Q.B. 431; Attwood v. Chapman, [19141 3 K.B.
275. See also Godson v. Toronto (1890), 18 S.C.R. 36, where the issue was
whether prohibition lay against a judge exercising the powers of a Commissioner under the Inquiries Act. Sir W. J. Ritchie C.J. held (at p. 40):
"The proceeding before the county court judge was in no sense a judicial
proceeding. The object of the inquiry was simply to obtain information for
the council ... and to report the result of the inquiry to the council with
the evidence taken, and upon which the council might in their discretion if
they should deem it necessary, take action. The judge was in no way acting
judicially; he was in no sense a court; he had no powers conferred to him
of pronouncing any judgment, decree or order imposing any legal duty or
obligation whatever on the applicant for this writ, nor upon any other
individual." Gwynne J., who dissented, expressed the following opinion: "It
is contrary to the principles of natural justice that any person should be subjected against his will to any jurisdiction in any person to inquire into his
conduct in respect of any matter, and to have evidence taken against him,
unless he should be given notice of the particular nature of the charge or
complaint made against him, and which he has to meet, and of the time and
place.of the taking of the evidence against him ... Although the judge was
not himself empowered to inflict any punishment upon the accused as a
consequence of his being, in his opinion and judgment, guilty of the malfeasance, breach of trust or misconduct charged, still as a result of the conclusion so arrived at by the judge, the accused would be subjected to serious
consequences affecting his reputation and his business, and to injuries of
a pecuniary nature which the corporation might inflict as the result of the
opinion and judgment formed by the judge upon the evidence." It is to be
noted that Sir W. J. Ritchie C.J. and Gwynne J. are not addressing themselves
to the same problem although both use the word "judicially". See, supra,
footnote 47. Ritchie C.J. is concerned whether the Commissioner was acting
in a judicial (as opposed to administrative) function and Gwynne J. whether
he had the duty to act judicially (i.e. in a manner consistent with the principles of natural justice). The issue of natural justice was not squarely raised
in Godson v. Toronto as it was in Guay v. Lafleur and therefore, Gwynne J.'s
dissenting judgment, which was not considered by the Court in Guay v. Lafieur
would have been relevant to that case.
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in a "judicial capacity" affects the right of the subject of the inquiry
to be present at the hearings5 0 and to cross-examine witnesses, 5' but
does not mean that the tribunal is released from the duty to act
52
judicially.

In searching for an alternative approach, the judgment of Mr.
Justice Owen, in the court below, merits serious consideration. The
learned Justice began with the observation that at opposite ends of
the scale there are two forms of procedure one of which may be
53
referred to as a private investigation and the other as a court case.
Private investigation involves the obtaining of information by a
detective, adjuster or some other investigator who may interview
witnesses and take a written statement or even a sworn declaration,
and embody the information so obtained in a report. The witnesses
are free to supply information or not and do not receive a summons
or subpoena which compels them to attend at a certain place to give
evidence under oath. In these circumstances the person being investigated cannot claim any right to notice of the investigation nor
any right to be present either in person or by counsel when the
witnesses are interviewed.
At the other end of the scale are what may be referred 'to as
court cases in which opposing parties put forward their contentions;
50 St. John v. Frazer, supra, footnote 18; Re Imperial Tobacco Co. and
Imperial Tobacco Sales Co., [1939] 3 D.L.R. 750 (Ont. H.C.); aff'd [1939] O.R.
627, 4 D.L.R. 99 (Ont. C.A.).
5' Re The Children's Aid Society of the County of York, [1934] O.W.N.
418 (Ont. C.A.), where it was held that everyone should have the right to
cross-examine any witness at a Royal Commission Inquiry whom he believes
to be in error or to be suppressing facts, but this right is not to be abused
by irrelevant questioning; Re Ontario Crime Commission, ex parte Feeley
and McDermott (1962), 34 D.L.R. (2d) 451, where parties whose activities
came under the scrutiny of the Commission were accorded the right to appear
represented by counsel and cross examine witnesses. (The decision is based
on the peculiar wording of The Public Inquiries Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 323, which
empowered the Court to review the discretion of the Commissioner; Laidlaw
J.A.'s dissenting judgment-apart from the peculiar statutory provisionprobably represents the law today.) But contra, see St. John v. Frazer,supra,
ootnote
18; Re ImperialTobacco Co., supra, footnote 50.
52 St. John v. Frazer, supra, footnote 18, at p. 452, per Davis J. "The
investigator was not a court of law nor was he a court in law, but to say
that he was an administrative body, as distinct from a judicial tribunal,
does not mean that persons appearing before him were not entitled to any
rights. An administrative tribunal must act to a certain extent in a judicial
manner, but that does not mean that it must act in every detail in its procedure the same as a court of law adjudicating upon a Us inter partes. It
means that the tribunal, while exercising administrative functions must act
'judicially' in the sense that it must act fairly and impartially.
"In this case the appellant had full opportunity to give evidence before
the investigator and his counsel was permitted to make representations and
argument on his behalf. Counsel was also given transcripts of all the evidence
... The absence of the right of cross-examination of every witness is not a
denial of justice. ..."
See also Re Imperial Tobacco Sales Co., supra,footnote 50, where in an
investigation under the Combines Investigation Act, the Court found that the
Commissioner did give reasonable notice to the appellants of the charges
alleged against them before any report was made, and allowed them opportunity to be heard in person or by counsel.
53 Supra,footnote 5, at p. 221 (C.T.C.).
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evidence and argument are submitted and a decision or judgment
rendered disposing of the rights of the parties. In these circumstances
a party whose rights are affected generally has a right to be notified,
to be present and represented by counsel, to cross-examine witnesses
and testify on his own behalf.
Between these two poles are many investigations, inquiries or
hearings which are neither private investigations nor court cases but
in certain respects resemble one or the other. In dealing with these
hybrid cases, Owen J. recommends:
It is difficult-and probably undesirable-to lay down all-embracing rules
regarding the rights of individuals concerned in and the obligation of
persons conducting these in-between cases, which vary all the way from
something close to a private investigation to something very close to a
court action. It seems to me that the best procedure is to look at each
particular
5 4 case and decide it in the light of the nature of the proceeding
involved.

Mr. Justice Owen is thus reduced to a case by case approach which is
not conducive to an orderly conceptual development of the law, but
perhaps, this problem, given the infinite variation of circumstances
which may arise in actual life, is no more susceptible of a solution in
principle than is the distinction between capital and profit, or the
definition of income.5 5 However, the learned Justice does make a
valuable contribution in pointing out that an inquiry or investigation,
even if
purely administrative, must be conducted fairly and impartially.56
Although the Commissioner in carrying out his duties, acted as an
administrative body and not a judicial body, he was bound to act judicially
in the sense that he was obliged to act fairly and impartially, or, in other
words, to act according
to the dictates of what has sometimes been termed,
natural justice.5 7

By bringing administrative acts within the scope of curial review,
the obscure and barren distinction between quasi-judicial and administrative acts is avoided, and the promise of justice diffused over a
wider base. Judicial review of administrative action requires considerable caution and must be of a limited nature depending upon
the circumstances. A court might act beyond its competence in reviewing on its merits the decision of an administrative tribunal or
agency peculiarly qualified to deal with matters of a particular nature,
but to require the administrator to exercise his discretion fairly and
in a judicial temperament is a task pre-eminently suited to the courts
and supported by authority.5 8 In performing this function there can
be no absolute standard of "natural justice" for the courts to apply;
much depends on the circumstances. The demands of natural justice
54 Ibid.
55 See F. E. LaBrie, The Principles of Canadian Income Taxation (1965);

G. S. A. Wheatcroft, The Law of Income Tax, Surtax and Profits Tax (1962).
The literature and case law on this subject is voluminous.
56 This proposition is by no means free from judicial conflict. See Thorson
P.'s remarks in M.N.R. v. Simpsons Ltd., [1953] Ex. C.R. 93.
57 Supra, footnote 5, at p. 225 (C.T.C.).
58 Cf. the policing power exercised by the courts in reviewing municipal
by-laws, e.g. Wiswel v. Winnipeg, [1965] S.C.R. 512, 51 D.L.R. (2d) 754.
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would increase the more closely the procedure approximated a court
action and in each case the court would have to balance expediency
with concern for the individual. This is, in essence, what the courts
already do when reviewing the conduct of administrative bodies or
the by-law making power of municipalities. 9 The distinction between
quasi-judicial and administrative functions is at best an obscure and

crude controlling device which prevents a reasonable compromise
between competing but valid interests and forces a choice in favour
of one to the the entire exclusion of the other. Abandonment of this
sophistic distinction in favour of a sliding scale of natural justice
applicable to cases on both sides of this obscure border would more
closely answer the exigencies of these competing interests in a society
which becomes daily more closely bound by the tentacles of administrative control. The standard which the court applies is always natural
justice but what constitutes natural justice varies with the circumstances. In the words of Lord Parmoor in Local Government Board v.
Arlidge:60
In determining whether the principles of substantial justice have been
complied with in matters of procedure, regard must necessarily be had
to the nature of the issue to be determined and the constitution of the
tribunal.

The legal mind rebels against any suggestion of an approach which is
not amenable to the application of established principles with
mechanical precision, but where reality cannot be kneaded and
moulded to suit the law, the law must accommodate itself to reality.
6
The problem which is the core of Guay v. Lafieur l is not susceptible to solution by general principle because it involves a clash
of two social philosophies. In a recent article, D. S. M. Huberman
stated:

Guay v. Lafleur manifests the re-emergence of a vital and pressing current problem, the theme of which is to strike a balance between law and
discretion, between the need for broad grants of power sufficient to ensure
effective government regulation and the need to limit that power 62and
protect the citizen from real or supposed unfairness and oppression.
The real conflict is below the surface: it is the conflict between the
value attributed to the individual and the demands of the community
as a whole. The constant re-defining of this relationship runs through
59 Home Oil Distributors Ltd. v. A.-G. of British Columbia (1938), 53
B.C.R. 355 (B.C. C.A.); United Amusement CorporationLtd. v. Kent Theatres
Ltd., [19441 Que. K.B. 736; Shannon Realties Ltd. v. Vile de St. Michel, [19231

A.C. 185 (P.C.). In these cases the Court refused to interfere with the administrative tribunal since review would have resulted in administrative chaos.
But of. Street v. Ottawa Valley Power (o., [1940] S.C.R. 40; Stephens v. Richmond Hill, [1955] 4 D.L.R. 572 (Ont. H-C.). Where legal aspects predominate,
the Court more readily intervenes in administrative adjudication. See also
Kruse v. Johnson, [1898] 2 Q.B. 91 (Div. Ct.); Scarborough Township v. Bondi

(1959), 18 D.L.R. (2d) 161 (S.C.C.).
Lord Reid's remarks in the important decision of Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964]
A.C. 40, at p. 65 (H.L.) lend support to such an approach.
60 Supra,footnote 20, at p. 140.
61 Supra, footnote 7.

62 D. S. M. Huberman, Inquiry or Investigation (1-965), 13 Can. Tax J.
343, at p. 347.
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the history of Western civilization. On the one hand, there is the
position represented by the majority in the Court of Queen's Bench
and Prof. Huberman who passes the following judgment on the decision of the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada:
It seems to me, with all due respect to the learned judges, that somewhere
along the line we have lost all sense of perspective when we are prepared to see the inherent rights of the individual subjugated to the conveniences of revenue collection
and to the more efficient administration
of the Income Tax Act; 63
and, on the other hand, the position taken by the majority in the
Supreme Court which favoured the efficient administration of the
community over the value of the individual. The quality of the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada depends in the final analysis
upon which of these competing values one espouses.64
It is the state of the law which determined the form this issue
would take when it arose before the court. The case might have been
decided either way because there was no strong overriding rule of
law which demanded either solution. 65 However, the distinction between administrative and quasi-judicial functions and the attendant
consequences with respect to curial review, precluded any compromise
between the two competing interests and made imperative absolute
victory for one of them. It was then merely a question of which
philosophical position each individual judge espoused. Where the law
is silent, the judge legislates.
63 Ibid., at p. 346. Italics mine. See also Rinfret J., supra, footnote 5, at
p. 210 (C.T.C.). "[Pour dtablir cette fraude, l'on ne doit pas proc6der avec
une partialitd et un arbitraire qui sied mal aux personnes chargdes de la
bonne administration de nos lois ....
Que l'on recherche la v6rit6, d'accord, mais que l'on proc8de avec impartialitd, que l'on accorde A l'enqudts un 'fair hearing', une audition impartiale,
tel que pourvu A l'art. 2(e) de la Ddclaration des Droits de l'Homme."
64 The Joint Committee representing the Canadian Bar Association and
The Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants in December 1964 submitted
recommendations that "subsection 126(4) be amended to provide that at any
Inquiry being conducted thereunder the subject about whose affairs the
Inquiry is being conducted should be entitled:
(a) to notice
(b) to be present and represented by counsel; and
(c)to cross-examine any person giving evidence under oath thereat."
See (1965), 8 Can. Bar J. 78, at p. 86.
65 Cf. Battary v. A.-G. Saskatchewan, [1965] S.C.R. 465, where the basic
issue was the same as in Guay v. Lafleur, but the Court decided in favour of
the individual. The ancient principle that the accused is not to be forced to
incriminate himself overrode the considerations which formed the basis of
the decision in Guay v. Lafleur.
Guay v. Lafleur is distinguishable from both Re Ontario Crime Commission, ex parte Feeley and McDermott, supra, footnote 51, and St. John v.
Frazer, supra, footnote 50. Unlike the Crime Commission case, the hearings
were held in camera and therefore would not create public embarrassment
for Lafleur without giving him an opportunity to vindicate himself before the
public at large. The St. John inquiry was not directed at any particular
person but at certain transactions in securities. The fact that the appellant's
conduct was examined was purely adventitious; the inquiry in Lafleur was
directed at a specific person. It must be noted, however, that this distinction
has more clarity in principle than reality in practice. It can be circumvented
in drafting the terms of the inquiry.
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The decision in Guay v. Lafteur66 raises many problems, beyond
the construction of The Income Tax Act, s. 126 (4)67, which remain
unanswered. Those who dislike the ever increasing extension of ministerial discretion in the Income Tax Act might ask themselves why
Parliament should consider that necessary. It would be curious to
speculate how Guay v. Lafleur 68 might have been decided had Cana69
dian courts never followed Partingtonv. Attorney-GeneraZ
and Duke
of Westminster v. C.I.R. 7 0 and given to taxing statutes the strict

literal construction otherwise applied to penal laws, but instead construed the Income Tax Act as any other statute.7 1 What attitude
might the Court have adopted to the taxpayer under circumstances

where taxation could not as easily have been avoided by a manipulation of the law with the assistance of astute tax counsel?
Guay v. Lafieur72 is a touchstone where all the problems of
administrative law converge. The issues of when there should be
curial review of administrative action, and to what extent, and what
standards are to be imposed on administrative action here demand an
answer. Scandanavian countries have reacted to this problem of
administrative review with the ombudsman, the civil law countries
with special administrative courts, 73 but the common law just
bumbles along.
The great question raised by Guay v. Lafteur74 is whether this
case represents a trend in which the value placed on unrestricted individual liberty is in decline and the demands of a complex interrelated society for conformity and subjection of individual "rights"
66 Supra, footnote
67 Supra, footnote
68 Ibid.

7.
2.

69 (1869) L.R. 4 H.L. 100, at p. 122, per Lord Cairns.

70 19 T.C. 490 (H.L.).
71 For an interesting discussion of the construction of the Income Tax
Act, see G. T. Tamaki, Form and Substance Revisited (1962), 10 Can. Tax J.
179; J. T. Thorson, Form and Substance (1966), 14 Can. Tax J. 59.
72 Supra, footnote 7.
73 For a penetrating criticism of the common law approach to administrative problems, see W. Friedmann, Law in a Changing Society (2d ed.
abridged, 1964), Part IV, "The Growth of Administration and the Evolution
of Public Law". At p. 317 Friedmann writes ". . . there are, in fact, two
systems of law in existence, and the dichotomy, 'evil' or otherwise, has been
with us for some time. The only difference between civil-law and the commonlaw jurisdictions is that the former openly recognize administrative law as
a discipline of its own, with its characteristic problems and solutions, whereas
the latter continue to live with the fiction that there is only one system of
law, the common law, with administrative sideshoots sprouting from the
stem here and there. The result is . . . that there is a widespread lack of
proper appreciation of characteristic public-law problems and institutions ....
The recognition of the duality of the legal system as an inevitable corollary
to the development of modem government-is a basic problem which the
common-law world can continue to ignore or belittle only at the cost of failing
to develop a healthy balance between the needs of administration in the
modem welfare state and the essential rights of the citizen."
This writer maintains that the Supreme Court of Canada in Guay v.
Lafleur refused to recognize even that this was a ZegaZ problem.
For a favourable view of the common law approach as compared with
the civil law by an administrator in a civil law jurisdiction, see R. Grcgoire,
Le Conseil d'Etat (1965), 8 Can. Public Admin. 495.
74 Supra, footnote 7.
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for the "common good" is in the ascendency. The pendulum had swung
a long way from the organic mediaeval society through the Renaissance to laissez-faire of the nineteenth century and now is returning.
The subtle encroachments of administrative regulation upon the lives
of the citizens have been growing at an accelerated rate. It would be
well to remember that a legal system shapes its society no less than
the nature of a society determines its legal system.
J. W. MIK

Deputy Minister of National Revenue v. McMillan & Bloedel (Alberni)
Ltd., [1965] S.C.R. 366.
CUSTOMS TARIFF - ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IMPLICATIONS OF CLASSIFYING IMPORTED GOODS - QUESTIONS OF FACT AND LAW.

The respondents purchased a Beloit 276-inch newsprint machine
with a rated mechanical speed of 2,500 feet per minute. On importation of the machine from Wisconsin, the Port Appraiser classified
the machine as being of a class or kind made in Canada and applied
Tariff item 427.1 The respondent requested that the newsprint machine
be classified
as of a class or kind not made in Canada under Tariff
2
item 427a.
The former item carried a rate of 22 % as compared with 71/
in monetary terms the difference is some $450,000.

;

The classification by the Port Appraiser was confirmed by the
Dominion Customs Appraiser and by the Deputy Minister of National
Revenue. From this decision the respondents appealed to the Tariff
Board and subsequently to the Exchequer Court of Canada. The
Deputy Minister of National Revenue appealed to the Supreme Court
of Canada.
The main issues raised in the Exchequer Court were: first, what
was the material time in determining whether the machine was or
was not of a class or kind made in Canada; secondly had the Tariff
Board erred in law in classifying the newsprint machine as it did.
The respondents argued that the material time for the purpose
of classification was the date on which the contract to purchase was
concluded. It followed, therefore, that although Dominion Engineering
Company Limited had subsequently manufactured a similar machine,
the mere willingness and ability, to manufacture at the date of contracting was irrelevant. To hold otherwise, it was contended, would
* J. W. Mik, M.A. (Toronto), LL.B. (Osgoode), is a member of the 1966
graduating class.
1 427. All machinery composed wholly or in part of iron or steel, n.o.p.,

and complete parts thereof.
2

427a. All machinery composed wholly or in part of iron or steel, n.o.p.,

of a class or kind not made in Canada, complete parts or the foregoing.

